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X. Z. Qiu
Abstract—High splitting, optically amplified, passive optical
networks (SuperPONs) are investigated in terms of redundancy
provision and protection mechanisms. Options for redundancy,
including the important special case of dual homing, are detailed,
and it is determined as to which of these options (duplication of
the feeder and first distribution section, and + 1 protection of
the optical amplifiers in the amplified splitter) would be required
to be provided to all attached users to facilitate appropriate
availability of the basic telephony service. The distributed am-
plified splitter dual homing solution is found to outperform the
single amplified splitter solution in terms of its survivability.
The protection mechanisms necessary to automatically switch to
the redundant provision are discussed and it is seen that with
the aid of suitable regular precautionary procedures protection
switching can generally be provided rapidly ( 50 ms). Finally
an availability, and cost versus availability, study confirms the
aforementioned redundancy assessment for fiber-to-the-home
(FTTH) implementations, but shows fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC) as
needing additional redundancy.
Index Terms—Access network, availability, dual homing, optical
amplification, protection switching, redundancy, super passive op-
tical network (SuperPON).
I. INTRODUCTION
I N BROAD-BAND telecommunication networks it has beenpossible to identify a general trend in which the relative
cost of signal transport is decreasing more rapidly than the cost
of switching. This provides the motivation for a node consol-
idation, whereby the number of switching nodes is reduced,
leading to access networks covering greater ranges and serving
larger user populations. An access system that potentially ben-
efits from the reduced investment and exploitation costs ob-
tained by node consolidation is a high splitting, optically am-
plified, passive optical network (SuperPON) [1]. Such systems
have been under investigation and development by the Photonic
Local Access Network (PLANET) consortium of the European
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Union Advanced Communications Technologies and Services
(ACTS) program. The aim of this paper is to investigate the
provision of redundancy within such a SuperPON system, in
order to enable it to meet the availability and survivability cri-
teria which will be delineated later.
The aim of PLANET was to define a cost-effective full-ser-
vice optical access network, based on the SuperPON concept,
which would accommodate specific service requirements within
telecommunications in the next decade. To meet the require-
ment for a greater range, SuperPONs were designed to reach
a nominal range of 100 km (though greater distances are pos-
sible with the use of further optical amplifiers [2]) and to support
2048 optical network units (ONU), both considerably exceeding
the specification of conventional PONs. Data rates of 2.5 Gb/s
downstream and 311 Mb/s upstream were chosen for the trial
network, enabling a broadband service basket to be offered to
a total of 15 000 living units [3] [passed in a fiber-to-the-curb
(FTTC) configuration]. The transport system is based on asyn-
chronous transfer mode (ATM) cells using time division mul-
tiplexing (TDM) downstream and time division multiple ac-
cess (TDMA) upstream, similar to the more conventional APON
(ATM over PON) systems being considered within the Full Ser-
vices Access Network (FSAN) initiative [4]. The challenges of
developing a medium access control (MAC) protocol for such
a large PON are described in [5]. Ranging over such advanced
PONs, with the greater range and larger user population, also
involves new challenges [6], [7]. Although redundancy and pro-
tection for conventional APONs has been considered both in the
standards [8], and more recently in the literature [9], they are
considerably more complex in the SuperPON case considered
herein.
In the next section, the SuperPON system developed by the
PLANET consortium is introduced, focusing on a semicon-
ductor optical amplifier (SOA) based solution. In Section III,
the resilience requirements for the access network are delin-
eated, whilst various options for redundancy in order to meet
them are described in Section IV. Dual homing of SuperPON
systems is discussed in Section V and the mechanisms used
to implement the various protection strategies are detailed
in Section VI. Availability and cost versus availability are
addressed in Section VII.
II. SUPERPON SYSTEMS
Fig. 1 shows the outline of the generalized PLANET Su-
perPON system. In essence the system consists of an optical line
termination (OLT), which contains the controlling electronics
for the SuperPON system together with its laser transmitter and
0733–8742/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE
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Fig. 1. General PLANET SuperPON architecture.
Fig. 2. SOA-based PLANET SuperPON architecture, with a redundant feeder implemented as standard (see Section IV) using passive splitter technology as
opposed to the optical switches proposed later.
burst mode receiver, housed in an access node (which may con-
tain OLTs of many different SuperPON systems), connected
by a feeder fiber cable to an amplified splitter (AS) unit. The
feeder may be extended into multiple fiber sections (F1, F2,
etc.) using one or more feeder repeater (FR) units. The first dis-
tribution section (D1) connects the AS to a number of passive
splitting units (SU), which in turn are connected to the ONUs
by the second distribution section (D2). ONUs may be located
in a fiber-to-the-home/premises (FTTH/P) configuration or in a
curb unit concentrating several subscribers (FTTC) with a very
high bit rate digital subscriber loop (VDSL) copper drop to the
network termination (NT) in each home [4]. A possible evo-
lution scenario from the current telephony network toward Su-
perPON based ultrabroad-band access networks is presented in
[10]. After such an evolution path the SuperPON access node
(AN) will be located at the same building as the transit of-
fice/switch in current networks, while the SuperPON AS will
be located in a position analogous to current local offices.
The most important physical layer difference between con-
ventional APONs and SuperPONs is the use of optical ampli-
fiers (OA). A wavelength of 1550 nm (with narrow-line DFB
laser transmitters to avoid dispersion penalties) was chosen for
downstream transmission to exploit the low fiber loss and to
enable the use of high performance erbium-doped fiber ampli-
fiers (EDFA). Upstream optical amplification is complicated by
the “noise-funneling” effect [2]. In the upstream optical split-
ters serve as signal combiners. However, the amplified spon-
taneous emission (ASE) noise from parallel optical amplifiers
is potentially also combined, severely degrading the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR). One solution to this problem is to employ
“burst mode operation” of the parallel optical amplifiers, re-
quiring them to be switched “ON” when they are to amplify an
ATM cell but to be turned “OFF” otherwise. The speed required
for this switching solution requires SOAs, with their short time
constant, to be used in the upstream—by comparison EDFAs
have very slow gain dynamics. The switchable SOAs were con-
trolled via the MAC-protocol and also offer the possibility of
cell-by-cell automatic gain control to reduce the signal dynamic
range [11]. PThis solution is considered exclusively within this
paper, though other architectural solutions have also been inves-
tigated, characterized by differing approaches to the upstream
of the system (based on upstream EDFAs or O/E/O regenera-
tion) [12], [13]. A possible configuration of the SOA solution
is shown in Fig. 2, though it should be noted that there is
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TABLE I
REQUIRED SERVICE AND ACCESS NETWORK AVAILABILITY
flexibility in the splitting arrangements, optical amplifier num-
bers, and positioning, etc. Furthermore, the 10 km distribution
is an upper limit, given the splitting ratio considered, while the
feeder can potentially be significantly longer. To enable bidi-
rectional transmission over a single fiber in the distribution sec-
tion, an upstream wavelength of 1310 nm was chosen and a
1310/1550 nm diplexer implemented at the ONU. In the feeder,
two fiber working was implemented to avoid the loss of WDM
duplexers (otherwise required either side of the optical ampli-
fiers) and any bidirectional crosstalk penalties. The upstream
burst mode transmitters at the ONUs were DFB lasers with 10
nm wavelength stability.
III. RESILIENCE REQUIREMENTS
The SuperPON network was required to be resilient to failure.
Hence, it must have both a high availability and a high surviv-
ability. The following resilience requirements apply to Super-
PONs from the user viewpoint:
R1) SuperPON services should exhibit sufficient avail-
ability.
R2) In the case of mains power failure, the telephony ser-
vice should remain available.
R3) The time to service recovery after a failure should be
limited.
Additionally, from the perspective of the network operator:
R4) No large group of users should be connected to a
single-point-of-failure.
Requirement R1) is studied in detail later in this paper. Ideally
the access network should achieve a mean down time (MDT) of
53 min/y , but this can be relaxed for telephony to 263 min/y ,
and for multimedia services to 2630 min/y (see Table I). Since
it is generally vital that the network operator provides the user
with a viable telephony service, we define the normal redun-
dancy requirement as that level of redundancy that enables the
availability for telephony to be met, for the maximum range Su-
perPON in a FTTH configuration. However, FTTC may need
additional protection, whilst some urban applications of the Su-
perPON may dispense with all the redundancy apart from that
of the feeder. The availability of the highest-grade leased line
is not easily achieved by a SuperPON without either improve-
ments in the operator’s repair intervention policy or additional
redundancy, beyond the normal redundancy requirement, in the
distribution section and/or at the customer end, for which the po-
tential leased line customer would pay extra. It is very important
to note that this also applies to any tree and branch topology ac-
cess network system, since the main failure contribution comes
from the cable plant. The availability criteria that must be ap-
plied to the access system are twice as stringent as those required
for the service overall, since one has to account for both ends
of the connection. It is also assumed that the core network has
enough redundancy to make its MDT contribution negligible. It
should be noted that, relative to a conventional APON, the pres-
ence of optical amplifiers, alongside the overall greater com-
plexity of SuperPON systems means that reliable software is im-
portant. However, to estimate the impact of software failure on
the SuperPON is a complex task made the more difficult by the
lack of hard failure data (though the microprocessor reset times
for the various PLANET modules are, of course, well known).
The options for redundancy in software are different to those in
hardware, since it is futile duplicating programs with the same
bugs. The MDT figures produced in preliminary studies sug-
gested that it was unlikely that advanced techniques, such as
multiple versions of the software, will be required if software
failures occur infrequently (less than once a week). Software
failure is viewed as negligible in the MDT calculations later in
this paper.
Requirement R2) necessitates ONUs that support telephony
to have battery back-up. Whether ONUs not supporting tele-
phony have battery back up depends on the operator’s policy.
The local powering concept is used for PLANET, assumed here
to have an availability of 99.999% [14]. This figure takes into ac-
count that, as well as a connection to the public energy supply,
all powered nodes have battery, or (at more important points)
diesel or gas turbine generator, backup. Requirement R3) di-
rectly relates to the need for rapid protection switching mecha-
nisms. Requirement R4) [and R3] can be related to major inci-
dents, like the destruction of an AN. As such incidents are rare,
they don’t affect the calculated network availability. However,
if such an event did occur, the repair of a totally destroyed AN
could take several months. For the user it is unacceptable to be
out-of-service for so long [R3], for the operator it is not good
to risk dissatisfaction of many users (and revenue loss) by one
incident [R4]. Such risks to the network survivability can be re-
duced by a special form of redundancy know as dual homing
(see Section V).
IV. OPTIONS FOR REDUNDANCY
Since an unprotected SuperPON cannot easily meet even the
relatively relaxed MDT requirement of multimedia services, the
availability of the network must be improved by implementing
physical layer redundancy in the form of protection elements
(optical amplifiers, OLTs) and double routed fiber cables. When
a failure occurs rapid protection switching (typically within 50
ms) is required in order to bring the spare into operation in the
main path, whilst removing the original from the main path.
There are a number of different options for redundancy. The
internodal redundancy options are shown in Fig. 3, with various
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Fig. 3. Redundant internodal SuperPON topologies.
Fig. 4. Intranodal redundancy options. (a) N + 1 protection of the OLTs of different SuperPON systems homed at the same AN. (b) The upper portion shows
N +1 protection of downstream EDFAs in the AS while the lower portion showsN +1 protection of upstream SOAs [specifically first stage (SOA1) and second
stage (SOA2)]. 1+ 1 protection is shown for the amplifiers in the common path in both the upstream and downstream. Note that the combination of the main and
redundant paths on the distribution, here depicted conceptually as a 2 : M splitter, will actually involve 1300 nm/1550 nm WDMs and optical switches (due to
the optical switching needs of D1 protection and as D1 consists of single bidirectional fiber).
combinations of the different options making up the set of pos-
sible redundant paths. The intranodal redundancy options are
depicted in Fig. 4. Fig. 4(a) shows protection of the OLTs
of different SuperPON systems homed at the same AN, facili-
tated by the placing of the optoelectronic components (Tx/Rx)
on a separate EO board. The upper portion of Fig. 4(b) shows
protection of downstream EDFAs in the AS (typically
), while the EDFA in the common path is protected
with a dedicated spare. The lower portion of Fig. 4(b) shows
protection of upstream SOAs in the AS. Typically there
are first stage SOAs (SOA1s), plus one spare, and
second stage SOAs (SOA2s), plus one spare. The third
stage SOA (SOA3) in the common path, is protected with a ded-
icated spare. In Table II, further description of each redundancy
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TABLE II
REDUNDANCY OPTIONS FOR FTTH SUPERPON
Notes
1. It is largely equivalent to duplicating the local office in the current telephony network, which network operators prefer to avoid.
2. This is because the distribution section is the power budget bottleneck [2] and some SUs (and thus ONUs) will require much longer
fiber spans to one AS than to the other.
3. AsN , in the unprotected SuperPON, is a power of 2 providing anN +1 way split requires nonstandard components—typically a 1:17
splitter in the downstream and one 2:5 and four 2:9 splitters in the upstream. If this proved problematic, the precise number of ONUs served
by the system could be adjusted so that N + 1, N =N + 1, and N + 1 are all standard splitting ratios; however, care must be taken to
match the total upstream and downstream splits.
4. It is possible to duplicate the SU and thus double route the whole distribution section, which constitutes a massive additional cable and
civil works cost that could only be considered when D2 duplication is required for the majority of users.
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Fig. 5. Single AS solution using optical switches.
option – is provided, along with whether they are re-
garded as a normal redundancy requirement and why, with an
orientation toward FTTH. For FTTC, it should be noted that du-
plication of the VDSL NT is also potentially appropriate, if re-
quired. However, it is not appropriate for the copper cable length
between the FTTC ONU and the NT to be duplicated, as this vi-
olates the operator’s intention to only re-use the copper that is
presently available in the network.
From the considerations in Table II, which are partly in-
formed by the availability versus cost results of Section VII, it
is apparent that the normal redundancy requirement for a FTTH
SuperPON consists of a double routed feeder, a double routed
first distribution section and protection ( for parallel
OAs, 1 1 for OAs at the feeder–AS interface) of the OAs
in the amplified splitter. Other possibilities, such as double
routing D2 or duplicating the ONU, can be considered for those
customers with more stringent availability requirements.
V. DUAL HOMING SUPERPON SYSTEMS
In this section, two different approaches, the single and dis-
tributed amplified splitter solutions, to dual homing SuperPON
systems are described, compared, and contrasted. Dual homing
is essentially the connection of ONUs to two ANs, and thus
two core network switches, in an attempt to improve the net-
work’s resilience to a localized catastrophic failure at an AN.
The single amplified splitter solution arises quite naturally from
the fact that the feeder is double routed as part of the normal
redundancy requirement. A double amplified splitter solution,
countering the network vulnerability to catastrophe at the AS,
is not considered for the reasons stated in Table II. However,
a distributed amplified splitter solution, with the advantage of
(partial) network survivability to incidents at the AS, as well as
double capacity and applicability to low user density areas, is a
strong candidate.
A. Dual Homed Single Amplified Splitter (DH-SAS) Solution
In Fig. 5, a dual homed single amplified splitter is depicted
(and hence this solution does not provide protection from a cat-
astrophic accident affecting the AS location). Here, all traffic
is supported by a single OLT, whilst the other is used only in
case of failure of the main path. The backup OLT is, however,
active and it communicates with the related operation, admin-
istration and maintenance (OAM) ONU to continuously mon-
itor the protection path. Note that OAM-ONUs are also present
Fig. 6. Distributed amplified splitter architecture principle.
at the FRs, but in this paper, except where stated otherwise,
OAM-ONU will refer to those based at the AS. Two paths to
the AS are available from two different locations, far apart from
each other: in the AS, crossover optical switches, controlled
by a switchover controller (SOC) within the amplified splitter
controller (ASC), are used to select the working path. Notice
that the OAM-ONU is duplicated to allow monitoring of the
protection path, as the standby OLT(2) establishes a point to
point communication with the standby OAM-ONU(2). The ac-
tive OAM-ONU(1) is the means by which the ASC can ex-
change OAM information with OLT1 and the operation system
(OS). It also passes to the ASC the synchronization informa-
tion needed to switch on/off the burst mode SOAs. The OAM
information channel from the ASC to OLT1 and OS can be du-
plicated via the OAM-ONU2 which, as noted above, maintains
continuous communication with OLT2. Thus, control of the AS
from the OS can be maintained also in case of a main path fault.
In case of fault in any element of the main path, the OAM-ONU
detects a loss of signal (or just a performance degradation) and
informs the ASC; after a pre-defined period of time the ASC or-
ders the optical switches to exchange the optical paths, and in-
forms (via the protection path) the OS that protection switching
had to be performed. From this moment on, the management
OS knows that a serious impairment has occurred on the main
path and hence that traffic needs to be restored via the protection
path. Note that re-routing of ATM traffic from/to the main AN
to the protection AN may imply re-establishment of all active
connections, involving the resources of the inner-core network.
B. Dual Homed Distributed Amplified Splitter (DH-DAS)
Solution
Given that, in low user density areas, the SuperPON capacity
would be inefficiently used, and also that in the DH-SAS the
bandwidth capacity of the OLT (and the switches) in the redun-
dant central office is not used efficiently, a SuperPON with a
distributed drop topology is identified. Since long feeders using
cascades of up to 16 SOA are feasible [2], it is possible to have
several dropzones connected to one SuperPON feeder. Thus,
in the DH-DAS architecture (see Fig. 6), several AS locations
exist, and from each AS a distribution network originates. The
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Fig. 7. Amplified splitter for the DH-DAS architecture.
bandwidth share may be flexibly modified to adapt to the needs
of a new neighborhood or a new business user. Upon cable cut
in the feeder ring, some of the drop zones are switched over. The
number of ONUs ordinarily served by one OLT here should be
smaller than 2048, so that one AN can take over the complete
SuperPON in case of, for example, a catastrophic failure in the
other AN. Since more users will be connected to one OLT upon
switchover, it may be necessary to reduce the bandwidth of con-
nections with a lower grade of service to cope with the smaller
average bandwidth available per user. To map this architecture
on to the existing duct infrastructure, the number of users served
by each AS should be close to the number of users served by ex-
isting cabinets (several hundreds). Thus, it is likely that there are
either 256 or 512 users per AS, with, respectively, eight or four
ASs to support 2048 ONUs. The AS for the DH-DAS architec-
ture is shown in Fig. 7 and incorporates a “regenerator section”
for amplification in the feeder ring, and to manage switchover
on the ring between the two OLTs, and a “distribution section”
for amplification and splitting of the signal to/from the distribu-
tion network. While the distribution section changes depending
on whether 256 or 512 users are served by the AS, the regener-
ator section is unchanged. OAM-ONUs are present on each path
between the AS and each OLT in order to monitor the down-
stream signal, extract/insert OAM information to/from the AS,
and provide the SOC with the necessary information for pro-
tection switching. The distribution section is designed with a
structure similar to the original one; in fact the only modifica-
tion needed is to adjust the splitting ratio at reference points (A)
and (B) in Fig. 7 depending on the number of attached ONUs.
C. Comparison of the Two Dual Homing Techniques
Table III summarizes and compares the main characteristics
of the single AS and distributed AS solutions.
It may be noted from Table III that the DH-DAS solution
is preferable over the DH-SAS solution in terms of bandwidth
capacity and network protection capacity (in the event of either
a feeder fiber or AS failure). That is, double bandwidth capacity
is available in normal operation and no single major incident at
any network element is able to completely interrupt traffic on the
entire network. It should be noted that any distinction between
the two approaches in terms of cost will be based on the fact that
the DH-DAS solution requires the provision and maintenance of
a greater number of amplified splitter cabinets per user (though
the amount of optical equipment per user is virtually identical).
VI. PROTECTION MECHANISMS
In this section protection switching issues are discussed, and
protection time calculations are performed, for a DH-SAS ar-
chitecture, augmented by redundant optical amplifiers in the
AS and double routed D1 fibers (the normal redundancy re-
quirement). However, first some further remarks about the Su-
perPON system are appropriate. First, it should be noted that
the transport system uses physical layer OAM (PLOAM) cells
for conveying messages between the micro-controllers of dif-
ferent locations. In a deployed PLANET system there will be
one software platform and transmissions via a common bus,
leaving a single microprocessor (plus spare) at the AS. The SOC
and the burst mode operation of SOA control function are du-
plicated, and integrated within each OAM-ONU. Thus, if the
OAM-ONU fails its entire integrated functionality is switched
to the spare OAM-ONU, with a feeder change. The OAM-ONU
is also assumed to be capable of a transmission power level com-
parable with the upstream signal leaving the AS (just amplified
by SOA3), which is not possible with the standard PLANET
ONU transmitter but an additional dedicated SOA may be used
without significant cost or MDT increases. There are optical
monitoring points at the output of each SOA and at both the
input and output of each EDFA. At all these places, and also the
OLT and the OAM-ONUs at the AS (and FR), it may be neces-
sary for the OA failure/loss of signal to be recognized rapidly,
initiating a train of events leading to a protection action.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON BETWEEN DH-SAS AND DH-DAS SOLUTIONS
Redundancy has a major impact on the system start up since,
to reduce traffic interruption time when protection switching,
ranging, gain leveling and burst mode receiver setting are also
carried out for the redundant paths. Thus, the initialization time
will be longer in a protected architecture. Once the system is op-
erational, regular monitoring of the redundant components and
paths will be required, so that they are available if needed. Mon-
itoring to verify availability of the redundant feeder is easily
performed as its OAs must be continually on for fast protec-
tion (two way communication is provided between the redun-
dant OLT and the redundant OAM-ONU and this path is shut
off from the live paths by optical switches at the AS). To verify
availability of the spare OAs note that the redundant EDFAs are
always on, and exposed to the downstream signal, enabling con-
tinual input and output monitoring, while monitoring the redun-
dant burst mode SOAs is effected by switching them on and off
during idle time slots (not necessary for the redundant SOA3 as
its output can be terminated away from the main path).
As well as monitoring for availability, it will be necessary to
monitor the optical power levels for the redundant paths, since
releveling at the time of protection switching is too time con-
suming (it would have to be done individually for each affected
ONU through the new path). The gain of burst mode SOAs are
set differently for each ONU to limit the necessary dynamic
range of the OLT burst mode receiver. These levels, and those
for the burst mode receiver itself, need to be set for the re-
dundant paths through the burst mode SOAs at system start up
and then periodically checked/releveled (due to temperature or
stress induced polarization changes or wavelength fluctuations),
for each ONUs path through each redundant SOA. This can be
carried out by checking during idle slots, and, if necessary, a full
releveling can then be commanded. It is facilitated because the
optical switching is only in the redundant path, so the redundant
path selection can be made without traffic interruption.
Ranging is a particularly important consideration since the
round-trip delay (RTD) will change upon switchover, even of
optical amplifiers (due to different patch-cord lengths). Thus,
affected ONUs need to be assigned new ranges for correct op-
eration of the TDMA mechanism. Rearranging of all affected
ONUs is time consuming and slows down the switchover time,
so the RTD of the possible redundant paths are ranged during
initialization of the system or connection of a new ONU. In
many cases it will be sufficient to range the redundant path for
one ONU and to calculate the RTD for the other ONUs affected
by a specific switchover, followed by a verification. The equal-
ization delays for the various protection scenarios are locally
stored at the ONU, and activated by a broadcast message from
the OLT upon switchover. The RTD of the redundant paths will,
however, vary during operation due to temperature variations.
Small changes up to one bit in duration can be handled in hard-
ware. To accommodate larger time shifts, the range of the redun-
dant paths should be monitored and updated frequently during
operation. There is generally no need for a controlled traffic in-
terruption to facilitate this since the range can be updated at the
same time that ordinary ranging for an ONU over the live path
is performed, by applying the same change in the “live” range
of the ONU to the ranges of the redundant paths involving that
ONU. This approach can be applied to any protection path that is
not different to the main path in its fiber sections. Protections in-
volving D1 or the redundant feeder require more care, but these
redundant paths can also have their range kept up to date with
only a minimal recourse to re-ranging with traffic interruption.
For example re-ranging is potentially unnecessary even when
switching feeders. To facilitate this it is noted that the range of
OAM-ONU1, and thus the live feeder, is continually updated
at OLT1. Similarly the range of OAM-ONU2, and thus the re-
dundant feeder, is continually updated at the redundant OLT2.
Then, the range of paths from OLT2 to customer ONUs through
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TABLE IV
PROTECTION TIMES FOR REDUNDANT PARTS
the redundant feeder, can simply be obtained by adjusting the
ranges from OLT1 before the failure with the difference in the
ranges OLT1 to OAM-ONU1 and OLT2 to OAM-ONU2. This
can be done at OLT2, by virtue of it receiving OLT1s up to date
ranging information via a core network connection.
The OLT monitors system performance by registering up-
stream PLOAM cells periodically sent by each ONU. If some
PLOAM cells do not arrive, the OLT can deduce which part
of the network is involved in a failure and stop giving permits
for upstream traffic from affected ONUs. In the case of an OA
failure and the path between the corresponding OAM-ONU and
the OLT remaining available, the OLT is informed about the
cause of the failure. In the other case the reason may be a cable
cut or an OA failure in a local node further downstream. In
that case the OLT first waits before commencing switch-over
to the redundant OLT, to see whether there is indeed a local
node failure which it is possible to restore within 50 ms. Such
fast switchover is feasible since the ranging and leveling of the
redundant paths are carried out in advance, and frequently up-
dated, as described above. It should be noted that if ONUs each
send PLOAM cells periodically at a sensible rate that is band-
width inexpensive (e.g., every 1 out of 32 cells so that each
ONU sends a PLOAM cell every 90 ms) the system must be
programmed so that OAM-ONUs use a different, higher rate
(e.g., a PLOAM every 5–10 ms) otherwise they can play no
part in the recovery process after a failure (that process must
be complete within 50 ms). If the problem is found to be in
the common feeder/OLT part of the network, then protocol con-
trol switchover (PCS) is instigated (i.e., control of the MAC etc.
is handed from OLT1 to OLT2). The redundant OLT becomes
aware that it must “go live” either via the core network (any
direct communication, including the exchange of ranging infor-
mation, between the two OLTs occurs in the core network) or via
the OAM-ONUs in the AS. PCS occurs in differing failure cir-
cumstances, with differing protection times (all around 50 ms)
due to different detection times and differences in the extent to
which information is known at each of the two OLTs and the
two OAM-ONUs. However 50 ms is not necessarily the time to
reconnection, since the core network also has to perform signifi-
cant re-routing, beyond the present scope. These times compare
favorably with those for the APON [9] because here a mecha-
nism is assumed whereby ranging for the new OLT-ONU links
has been carried out in advance, via regular communication of
ranging information from OLT1 to OLT2 before switchover, as
described earlier.
The procedures for the protection of the various network el-
ements [i.e., for it to be possible for live communication be-
tween the OLT and affected ONU(s) to be re-established] are
too lengthy to detail here. The timings of the procedures, given
here, were obtained from a detailed consideration of the order
of events, and the state of the system after each, given many
known time durations (e.g., optical switching time, propaga-
tion times, cell processing and assembly times, RTD including
timing equalization at the ONU, etc.) and programmable time
intervals (see below). It is assumed, for simplicity, that there is
a single failure originating event. Note also that there are dif-
ferent ways for an optical amplifier to fail and thus different de-
tection and protection times. The EDFA or SOA module could
itself fail, but control electronics failure is more likely. The tim-
ings given below account for the longest of these processes. For
D1 protection the SOC in the AS realizes that the absence of
signals is due to a D1 failure if there is a continuous loss of
PLOAM cells (at SOA1 output) from 1 ONUs on that SOA1
branch without loss of ASE (the larger the longer the detec-
tion time, but the surer it is that D1 has failed rather than in-
dependent events disconnecting several, but not all, ONUs on
that branch). An optical switching time of 15 ms was assumed,
but switching times as low as 5 ms are feasible. The protec-
tion time results are summarized in Table IV. Note that is the
(programmable) interval between PLOAM cells specifically for
146 JOURNAL OF LIGHTWAVE TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 19, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2001
Fig. 8. MDT of various architectures (min/y) using conservative MTTR and fiber failure rates (U= unprotected apart from redundant feeder, P= protected with
normal redundancy requirement).
the OAM-ONU1 and is the (programmable) interval between
dark cells for the whole network. Programmed dark cells occur
as a result of an unused grant (as opposed to those arising from
a lack of traffic) and can be used to monitor SOA ASE levels,
thus giving an indication of correct SOA functioning in a peri-
odic fashion for each branch of the upstream network. It can be
seen, from Table IV, that the principle of protection switching
within 50 ms is feasible for a SOA based SuperPON. Similar to
a conventional APON, if POTS (plain old telephony service) or
ISDN are considered then a “hitless” protection switching can
be achieved since these connections remain open if the link is
not down for more than 120 ms [9].
VII. AVAILABILITY AND AVAILABILITY VERSUS COST STUDIES
Availability calculations are performed for the protected and
unprotected SuperPON architectures following the methodolo-
gies of [15], [16]. Nodal and fiber unavailabilities, and hence
MDTs, are calculated from mean time to repair (MTTR) values,
and from equipment failure rates arising from the specific com-
ponents and subsystems designed within PLANET. Simple
probability expressions cater for duplicated fiber sections (e.g.,
feeder, D1) where required. Markov based state space methods
are used to evaluate the MDTs appropriate to intranodal stages
incorporating protection. One can then approximate that
for the assumed small MDTs (i.e., unavailabilities 1) that the
SuperPON MDT is the sum of the MDTs for each functional
block (node or fiber section).
The single AS approach was considered for simplicity,
though the distributed approach is very similar in terms of
availability (as opposed to survivability). Equipment failure
rates were determined assuming that all active nodes are
in controlled environments (i.e., ground benign), with the
exception of the FTTC ONU which is not controlled (i.e.,
ground fixed), since the use of cooling fans in numerous
large curb-side units would be noise polluting and require
additional maintenance. The conservative and optimistic failure
rates used for fiber cabling were average figures based on the
experience of the operators within the PLANET consortium,
while the conservative and optimized MTTR figures used arise
from the (averaged) experience of the same operators. Fig. 8
shows the MDT results from using conservative MTTR and
cable failure rates, and Fig. 9 shows the same arising from
an optimized repair intervention strategy and with best case
cable failure rates. A range of user densities are considered,
which lead to different lengths of distribution fiber. Availability
for the maximum distribution length (10 km) situation is also
considered. The “unprotected” cases do include a double routed
feeder whilst, where protection is indicated, it is the normal
redundancy requirement of a double routed feeder and first
distribution section along with protection of the OAs
in the AS. From Fig. 8, it is seen that for all but the lowest
user densities (and longest distribution) FTTH reaches the
POTS target (263 min/y) without the need of protection. With
protection FTTH always reaches the POTS target and, in the
best case, is quite near the target for leased lines (53 min/y).
However unprotected FTTC fails the POTS target even in the
best case, except at very high user densities, and protected
FTTC makes the POTS target in the best case but not in the
worst. For FTTC the normal redundancy requirement (i.e., that
for FTTH) is thus not quite adequate. The intrinsic difference
between the FTTC and FTTH results arises because FTTC has
an additional node—the curbside ONU (note that the FTTH
ONU is roughly equivalent to the VDSL NT in availability
terms) which is also more complex, being co-located with the
VDSL LIM (line interface module), and, unlike the FTTH
ONU, is in an uncontrolled (ground fixed) environment for
reasons stated earlier. Additional differences arise between the
FTTC and FTTH results for the same user densities since the
(15 000 user) FTTC system will then have a longer distribution
range than the (2048 user) FTTH system.
The impact of progressive redundancy is shown in Fig. 10
(for FTTH) and Fig. 11 (for FTTC). It is particularly impor-
tant for FTTC given the normal redundancy requirement does
not quite give FTTC the availability to support POTS. It is ob-
served that FTTH can achieve the MDT necessary for leased
lines (53 min/y) in the most redundant case, the residual MDT
arising from the AS, the SU , the ONU powering and a small
contribution from the double routed feeder. This result is worse
than that for two totally separate SuperPONs serving the same
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Fig. 9. MDT of various architectures (min/y) using optimized MTTR and best case fiber failure rates (U= unprotected apart from redundant feeder, P= protected
with normal redundancy requirement).
Fig. 10. MDT (min/y) for various levels of protection of the FTTH SOA architecture (U = unprotected part, P = protected part).
user, but has a lower component cost. Note also that the POTS
target for FTTH can be reached with the feeder and D1 pro-
tected, but without also requiring OA protection. For FTTC the
addition of D2 protection to the normal redundancy requirement
allows the provision of POTS fairly comfortably in the opti-
mized case, but just fails in the conservative case (but an av-
erage of the two cases would see POTS supported). If the ONU
(including VDSL line interface modules) was also made redun-
dant then FTTC comfortably supports POTS. By contrast if the
ONU was made redundant instead of D2 (no columns for this
are shown) then FTTC can just support POTS.
To study availability versus cost normalized Year 2000 invest-
ment costs (as opposed to the costs of ownership [17]), com-
prising of civil work, cable and component costs, are consid-
ered. Of these cable costs, while not negligible, are the least
significant. For FTTH civil works costs dominate whilst for
FTTC there is more balance due to copper re-use by VDSL.
Fig. 12 shows a scattergram of MDT versus normalized cost
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Fig. 11. MDT (min/y) for various levels of protection of the FTTC SOA architecture (U = unprotected part, P = protected part).
Fig. 12. MDT (min/y) versus normalized cost for the SOA1architecture with 500 users/km .(U = unprotected part, P = protected part)[FTTH: (A)
U: F,D1,OA,D2,ONU, (B) P: F U: D1,OA,D2,ONU, (C) P: F,D1 U: OA,D2,ONU, (D) P: F,D1,OA U: D2,ONU, (E) P: F,D1,OA,D2 U: ONU, (F) P:
F,D1,OA,D2,ONU] [FTTC: (a) U: F,D1,OA,D2,ONU,NT, (b) P: F U: D1,OA,D2,ONU,NT, (c) P: F,D1 U: OA,D2,ONU,NT, (d) P: F,D1,OA U: D2,ONU,NT, (e)
P: F,D1,OA,D2 U: ONU,NT, (f) P: F,D1,OA,D2,ONU U: NT, (g) P: F,D1,OA,D2,ONU,NT].
for the FTTH and FTTC architectures, with 500 users/km re-
spectively, using results from conservative MDT calculations.
For FTTH it can be seen that double routing the feeder gives
the best decrease in MDT per unit cost (uc) increase (10 194
min/uc), while the duplication of D1 and the protection of OAs
in the AS also yield good MDT decreases per cost increase.
However, duplication of the ONU only has a MDT decrease of
600 min/UC, and duplication of D2 a decrease of 74 min/uc.
For FTTC the MDT improvement per unit cost increase is gen-
erally more impressive, as would be expected given the addi-
tional infrastructure sharing. The feeder (73 992 min/uc) is again
most impressive, while the OAs and D1 are also very significant.
The ONU (1263 min/uc) and the VDSL NT (1192 min/uc) are
much less worthwhile duplicating, and D2 is again worst (522
min/uc). From these considerations of cost versus MDT it is
verified that the normal requirement, identified in Table II, of
making the feeder, D1 and the AS OAs redundant is reasonable
in both FTTH and FTTC architectures. It is also seen that, for
FTTH, duplication of D2 or the ONU is not particularly cost-ef-
fective, supporting their omission from the normal redundancy
requirement identified in Table II. However FTTC, in partic-
ular, may require further redundancy. This can potentially be
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achieved more cost effectively by a redundancy of the FTTC
ONU, though duplicating this without duplicating D2 may not
be straightforward.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
SuperPONs have been investigated in terms of redundancy
provision and protection mechanisms. Various options for re-
dundancy have been discussed and duplication of the feeder and
first distribution section, and protection of the optical ampli-
fiers in the AS, have been identified qualitatively and via avail-
ability calculations as forming part of the normal redundancy
requirement provided to all attached users to facilitate appro-
priate availability of the basic telephony service. Dual homing
was also described and the distributed AS solution was found
to be more survivable than the single AS solution. The pro-
tection mechanisms necessary to automatically switch to the
redundant provision have been discussed and calculated and,
with the aid of suitable regular precautionary procedures, pro-
tection switching can generally be provided rapidly ( 50 ms)
for a commercial implementation of the SuperPON. Availability
versus cost calculations have also been provided, demonstrating
the decreasing benefit in mean down time per unit cost as the re-
dundancy nears the user.
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